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Abstract 
"On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Disputation XV" by 
Francisco Suarez and translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy is 
reviewed.  
Suarez, Francisco. On the Formal Cause of Substance: 
Metaphysical Disputation XV. Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah 
Reedy. Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, vol. 36. Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2000. 217 pp. Paper, $25.00-This latest 
volume in the long-running Marquette University series Medieval 
Philosophical Texts in Translation provides students of late medieval, 
renaissance, and early modern philosophy with an important new 
resource. While Suarez's significance in the history of philosophy is 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Review of Metaphysics, Vol 54, No. 4 (June 2001): pg. 946-948. Publisher Link. This article is © Philosophy Documentation 
Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy 
Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
2 
 
well known, his writings have been rather inaccessible to students 
ignorant of Latin. Of the 54 disputations that constitute his most 
famous work, the Metaphysical Disputations, only 13 have been 
translated into English prior to the volume under review. The present 
volume presents Suarez's extended discussion of the issue of 
substantial and accidental forms. In addition to the translation itself, 
the translators provide a brief introduction, indices (both name and 
subject), a brief bibliography restricted to works in English as well as 
basic notes. Most of these notes identify sources (although some 
sources are left unidentified) and provide basic explication of difficult 
arguments and technical terms.  
In the Disputation itself, Suarez follows his typical procedure of 
canvassing a wide array of previous opinions on the topic under 
consideration. This methodology in itself makes Suarez well worth 
reading as he provides a encyclopedic compendium of prior thought on 
the subject of substantial forms. Starting with a consideration of the 
need to posit substantial forms, Suarez concludes that the rational soul 
provides the best evidence for such forms. Nonetheless, he also admits 
that the rational soul is peculiar in that it is the only substantial form 
that arises from nothing by a proper creation. All other substantial 
forms result from the potency of pre-existing matter and are not the 
result of creation as such, but can be considered created only insofar 
as the composite is created. Thus matter is always logically 
presupposed in any production of form other then the rational soul. 
Turning to the nature of substantial forms, Suarez takes a position at 
odds with that of Thomas Aquinas. For Suarez, the substantial form is 
not that which gives being to the composite, but simply is the act that 
constitutes the essence of a composite. Interestingly, he sees his 
thought as consistent with the Aristotelian teaching (Physics, 11.3) 
that form is the nature of the essence. It would be an interesting 
project to juxtapose recent interpretations of Aristotle's theory of form 
with the nuanced view that Suarez provides.  
After discussing the existence and nature of substantial form, 
Suarez turns to a discussion of form's causality. First he distinguishes 
between the causality of the form in relation to an entity's first act and 
its second act: the former concerns the principle by which the form 
acts, while the latter refers to the action of the form itself. 
Consequently, he argues that in relation to an entity's first act form is 
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a principle of actuality through itself simply by being present to its 
matter or the composite. In relation to an entity's second act, the 
emphasis resides in the union of form and matter in a composite. 
Again, a crucial consideration on behalf of his position is found by 
considering the human soul. Because the human soul can exist apart 
from the body, the act of the form must be really distinct from the 
form itself. As a result, the union resulting from form is its proper act. 
Finally, he discusses the unicity of substantial form, following Thomas 
Aquinas in rejecting a plurality of substantial forms in one substance. 
Here he uses Ockham's razor to point out that just because there is an 
essential predicate picking out a function, there is no reason to posit a 
separate substantial form for each such predicate. Since the summary 
I have provided gives little indication of the richness and depth of 
Suarez's treatment of the issue of substantial form, the translators 
have done a great service in making this disputation available to 
students of scholastic philosophy.  
The translation itself is clear, accurate, and readable, rendering 
Suarez's limpid Latin prose into useful English. There are a number of 
typographical errors, but none mars the meaning of the text. The 
bibliography, although restricted to works in English, has several 
notable omissions: for example, Dennis Des Chene's Physiologic: 
Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996) is directly relevant to the subject of 
Suarez and substantial form.  
 
